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Summary.     This paper extends Wheelock and Kumbhakar’s (1995) test for moral hazard 
in the Kansas deposit insurance system 1910-1920.  This paper tests and finds evidence 
of omitted bank-specific effects.  Estimates in Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1995), as a 
result, are biased.  This paper introduces unobserved individual heterogeneity to the test for 
moral hazard, corrects their estimates, and finds more evidence of moral hazard in the 
Kansas deposit insurance system. 
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Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Deposit Insurance System: Revisited 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
Wheelock and Kumbhakar’s (1995) W&K henceforth provide empirical 
evidence of the perverse incentives that deposit insurance systems may have on banks’ 
risk-taking behavior.  W&K report evidence of both adverse selection and moral hazard in 
the Kansas deposit insurance system early in the twentieth century. This paper extends 
W&K moral hazard test by introducing unobserved individual heterogeneity.  Exploiting 
the panel data information structure of the sample is a natural extension to W&K.  
Furthermore, there is evidence i.e., Wheelock and Wilson (1995) that suggests that 
W&K might have omitted variables that convey bank specific information.  This paper tests 
and finds evidence of unobserved heterogeneity across banks.  W&K’s estimates, as a 
result, are biased.  In particular, W&K failed to find the statistically significant negative 
effect that bank insurance membership had on bank surplus/loans ratio.  This paper 
improves W&K test for moral hazard, corrects their estimates, and finds more evidence of 
moral hazard. 
 
2. Data Set. 
 
The data set Wheelock and Kumbakhar made available includes a random 
sample of 212 banks that operated in Kansas from 1910 to 1920, which we then adjusted by 
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excluding 8 banks that had been open for less than a year by 1910 since those were not 
eligible for deposit insurance in that year.1  The data set covers the years 1910, 1914, 1918, 
and 1920, for which bank balance sheets are available.  Our data set, then, includes 
information for 204 banks; in contrast, W&K report using a data set with 205 banks.  
Furthermore, 427 out of our 816 observations report insured status, whereas W&K report 
438 out of their 820 observations with insured status. In sum, we do not work with exactly 
the same sample as W&K. 
 
Table 1 presents the definition of the variables of study.  DI is the dummy 
variable for bank insurance status.  Four alternative financial ratios are used as proxies for 
bank risk-taking behavior.  In general, Age, Bankpop, and DIratio contain information 
about the competition banks faced; whereas ∆Impacre, ∆Landvalue, ∆Pop, and Rural 
contain information about local economic and demographic conditions.2 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3. Moral Hazard Test. 
 
A test for moral hazard involves contrasting the risk-taking behavior of insured 
versus uninsured agents.  Moral hazard would be present in a deposit insurance system if, 
                                                          
1  “We omit banks that were ineligible for insurance system membership because of insufficient capital or 
age, including all banks that opened after the insurance system was begun.” (Wheelock and Kumbhakar, 
1995, p. 193.) 
2  See W&K for details on the variables. 
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after controlling for other factors, insured banks engage in riskier behavior than uninsured 
banks.  W&K test for moral hazard in the Kansas deposit insurance system involves the use 
of Grossman’s (1992) two-stage estimation process:  equation (1) is estimated as a Probit 
model to produce the estimate for bank insurance membership, DI , which is then included 
as a regressor in the least-squares estimation of equation (2).3   
 
        (1) ),,(1 BankpopDIratioAgefDI =
 ),,,,,,(2 LandvalueImpacrePopRuralBankpopAgeDIfR ∆∆∆=    (2) 
 where, {R =  }/,/,/ assetsloansdepositscashloanssurplussets,capital/as
 
The parameter estimate for DI  in equation (2), thus, determine whether the 
Kansas deposit insurance system suffered from moral hazard.  Kansas deposit insurance 
system suffered from moral hazard if the parameter estimate for DI  is statistically 
significant and has a negative sign for R={capital/assets, surplus/loans, cash/deposits} or 
positive for R={loans/assets}.4  The data set excludes those banks that began operations 
after the insurance system started.  Thus, “banks that might have opened for the purpose of 
exploiting the insurance system are thus excluded, and hence our results should understate 
                                                          
3  Grossman (1992) procedure is followed in order to avoid the selectivity bias that would be present if 
equation (2) were to be estimated with DI as a regressor.  That is, a bank risk preference would determine its 
decision whether to join the deposit insurance system.  
4  “Option-theoretic model of deposit insurance, such as Merton’s (1977), predict that banks will find it 
optimal to maintain lower capital/asset ratios and more risky asset portfolios with insurance than they would 
in the absence of insurance.”  (Wheelock and Kumbhakar, 1995, p. 196.)  “The capital/asset ratio is not the 
only possible risk measure available to us, and we also test whether deposit insurance caused differences 
across banks in the other financial ratios identified by White (1984) and Wheelock (1992) as useful predictors 
of bank failure in this area. If moral hazard characterized the Kansas insurance system, we expect to find that 
 3
the extent of adverse selection and moral hazard in the Kansas system.” (Wheelock and 
Kumbakhar, 1995, p. 193.)   
 
4. Estimation Results. 
 
We performed moral hazard tests as W&K but for the inclusion of unobserved 
bank-specific effects.5  Exploiting the panel data information structure of the sample is a 
natural extension to W&K.  Furthermore, in contrast to what W&K implicitly assume, 
Wheelock and Wilson (1995) show that state-chartered Kansas banks during 1910-1928 
were non-homogenous in technical efficiency.  This paper, thus, introduces heterogeneity 
into W&K estimation process in order to capture some of the bank specific effects that 
might have been left out in W&K moral hazard tests.   
 
Probit model (1) with unobserved heterogeneity is estimated using random 
individual effects, given that the fixed effect probit model renders inconsistent estimates 
and some incidental parameters may not be estimated Green (2000), Hsiao (2003).6  
Moral hazard regression model (2) with unobserved heterogeneity is estimated using fixed 
effects, in order to maintain the OLS estimation procedure in the second stage of the test.7  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
insurance system membership had a negative impact on the surplus/loan and cash/deposit ratios of insured 
banks, and a positive impact on their loans/assets ratios.”  (Wheelock and Kumbhakar, 1995, p. 197.) 
5  “We pool the observations on each bank in the simple across the tour years for which data are available.” 
(Weelock and Kumbhakar, 1995, p. 196.) 
6  Fixed effects probit model was estimated and tested against the random effect model. According to 
Hausman specification test, the null hypothesis of random effect cannot be rejected at a ten percent 
confidence level. Also, the incidental parameter could not be estimated for 104 banks; that is, 416 
observations were bypassed. 
7  Estimation of equation (2) assuming random bank specific effects does not change the conclusions obtained 
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The software NLOGIT, v. 3.0.10, is used to estimate the regression models. 
 
Estimation results for the first stage of the estimation process are reported in 
table 2, which includes probit and random effect probit estimates, as well as probit 
estimates reported in W&K for comparison purposes.8  Besides the regressors listed in table 
2, regional and annual dummy variables are also included in order to control for systematic 
differences across state regions and time. 
 
According to both likelihood ratio and Hausman tests, one can reject the null 
hypothesis that bank specific effects are not significant at the one percent confidence level.  
W&K probit estimates, as a result, are biased.  Random effect probit estimates do not 
reverse the sign of probit estimates or their statistical significance, but they are significantly 
larger in absolute value than probit estimates.  Random effects probit estimation of 
bank insurance membership is used in the second stage of the moral hazard test. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Estimation results for bank risk regressions are reported in table 3, which 
includes least squares (OLS) and fixed effects (FEM) estimates, as well as the least squares 
estimates reported in W&K’s table 4 (W&K OLS) for comparison purposes.9  OLS renders 
                                                                                                                                                                                
9  OLS and W&K OLS does not have the same model specification.  W&K OLS includes the probit estimate 
 
from the fixed effect estimation procedure. 
8  Both probit and W&K probit have the same model specification; however, as is discussed in section 2, our 
sample is not be exactly the same as in W&K. 
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the same evidence of moral hazard as W&K:  bank insurance membership has a statistically 
significant negative effect on the capital/assets ratio, but not on the other financial ratios.  
However, both F- and likelihood ratio tests conclude that the null hypothesis of no fixed 
effects can be rejected at the one percent confidence level.  W&K estimates, thus, are 
biased again.  Moral hazard test should be then based on FEM results, which conclude that 
bank insurance membership has a statistically significant negative effect on both 
capital/assets and surplus/loans ratios.   
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
There is evidence, then, that the Kansas deposit insurance system suffered from 
moral hazard.  Insured banks, for instance, held a capital/assets ratio that on average was 
1.15 percentage points smaller than uninsured banks.10  In contrast, W&K estimated that 
insured banks held a capital/assets ratio that on average was 2.81 percentage points smaller 
than uninsured banks.  On the other hand, insured banks held a surplus/loans ratio that on 
average was 1.32 percentage points smaller than uninsured banks.11  In contrast, W&K 
found no significant effect of bank insurance membership on bank surplus/loans ratio.  
Finally, like W&K, this paper finds no evidence that bank insurance membership was a 
determinant of bank cash/deposit and loans/assets ratios. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
of  as a regressor; in contrast, OLS includes the random effects probit estimate of  as a regressor. DI DI
10  The average capital/assets ratio for all banks is 17.05 percent. 
11  The average surplus/loans ratio for all banks is 8.91 percent. 
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Table 1.  Definition of Variables. 
Variable Definition 
DI Deposit Insurance Status:  1, insured bank; 0, otherwise. 
Age The number of years between a bank’s charter date and balance-sheet date. 
Bankpop The number of state chartered banks in a county divided by county population. 
Diratio The ratio of insured to total state banks in a county. 
∆Impacre The percentage change in county improved farm acreage, 1910 to 1920. 
∆Landvalue The percentage change in county farm land value per acre, 1910 to 1920. 
∆Pop The percentage change in county population, 1910 to 1920. 
Rural The proportion of a county population located on farms or towns less than 2,500 
persons. 
capital/assets 
surplus/loans 
cash/deposits 
loans/assets 
 
These financial ratios are used as alternative measures for banks’ risk-taking 
behavior. 
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 Table 2.  Probit Model:  Dependent Variable, DI. 
      W&K Probit1             Probit Random Effects Probit
Variable Parameter Derivative Parameter Derivative Parameter Derivative
Age 0.01 ** 0.016 ** 0.006 0.081 ** 0.010
1.96 2.16 2.16 2.23 2.23
DIratio 3.65 *** 3.635 *** 1.448 10.793 *** 1.276
12.39 12.11 12.12 6.67 6.74
Bankpop -0.03 -0.146 -0.058 -0.254 -0.030
-0.16 -0.68 -0.68 -0.23 -0.23
Constant -1.56 *** -2.339 *** -0.932 -7.643 *** -0.904
-4.95 -7.92 -7.87 -4.89 -4.87
ρ 0.912
47.97
Log-L -369.39 -250.56
% Correct 78 78.55 78.92
N = 820 DI = 0 for 382 obs N = 816 DI = 0 for 389 obs
LR test: Χ21 = 237.65; p-value = 0.0000
Hausman test: h = 183.49; p-value = 0.0000
1  Estimates as reported in W&K, equation (1).
t-statistics are reported in cursive; statistical significance: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.
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Table 3.  Moral  Hazard Test: Stage 2.  Dependent Variables: capital/assets, surplus/loan, cash/deposits, loans/assets.a 
                  capital/assets                  surplus/loans                  cash/deposits                   loans/assets
Variable W&K OLSb,c     OLSc     FEM W&K OLSb,c     OLSc     FEM W&K OLSb,c     OLSc     FEM W&K OLSb,c     OLSc     FEM
-2.810 *** -1.538 *** -1.151 ** -0.990 -0.652 -1.316 *** -0.380 -0.140 0.315 -1.820 -0.545 -0.741
-3.10 -2.98 -2.05 -1.27 -1.48 -2.95 -0.21 -0.13 0.24 -1.09 -0.55 -0.60
Age -0.010 -0.008 -0.023 0.160 *** 0.168 *** 0.120 0.020 0.020 -0.471 -0.060 -0.072 0.262
-0.32 -0.29 -0.13 5.93 6.28 0.83 0.46 0.39 -1.08 -1.32 -1.59 0.65
Bankpop 0.210 1.118 4.555 * 1.730 * 2.209 ** 1.441 -8.080 *** -8.443 *** -31.161 *** 9.930 *** 10.017 *** 31.637 ***
0.16 0.86 1.92 1.68 2.14 0.76 -3.75 -3.92 -5.50 5.37 5.40 6.04
Rural 3.770 4.236 *** 1.470 1.380 4.650 ** 5.486 ** -2.020 -2.734
2.90 3.22 1.37 1.30 2.09 2.43 -1.03 -1.37
∆Pop 0.020 *** 0.021 0.020 0.020 -0.010 -0.006 0.030 0.023
1.00 1.30 1.24 1.62 -0.39 -0.22 1.35 0.97
∆Impacre -0.001 -0.004 -0.030 *** -0.035 *** -0.010 -0.009 0.020 0.023
-0.12 -0.24 -2.41 -2.56 -0.45 -0.27 0.77 0.81
∆Landvalue 0.030 0.045 ** 0.000 0.007 0.040 0.049 -0.030 -0.026
1.55 2.39 0.17 0.40 1.22 1.64 -1.20 -0.97
Constant 10.550 *** 15.281 *** 4.570 *** 4.134 *** 27.270 *** 36.999 *** 67.380 *** 63.952 ***
5.36 11.33 3.08 3.54 7.62 13.50 21.78 26.58
R2 0.3200 0.3495 0.7655 0.1000 0.1273 0.7145 0.2300 0.2368 0.5947 0.2200 0.2181 0.5938
Adj R2 0.3389 0.6846 0.1132 0.6160 0.2244 0.4550 0.2054 0.4538
d. f. 802 606 802 606 802 606 802 606
s.d.e(i) 0.0572 0.0395 0.0479 0.0315 0.1129 0.0946 0.1055 0.0874
OLS vs FEM OLS vs FEM OLS vs FEM OLS vs FEM
F-test F(203,606) = 5.73, p-value = .0000 F(203,606) = 6.35, p-value = .0000 F(203,606) = 2.97, p-value = .0000 F(203,606) = 2.97, p-value = .0000
LR-test Χ 2203 = 874.14; p-value = .0000 Χ 2203 = 929.89; p-value = .0000 Χ 2203 = 563.50; p-value = .0000 Χ 2203 = 563.68; p-value = .0000
a   Reported coefficients are 100 times larger than their actual value; t-statistics are reported in cursive; statistical significance: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%.
b   W&K OLS are the estimates reported in table 4 in W&K, where       was estimated using a probit model. 
c   Standard errors were corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
DI
DI
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